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Abstract: 
 This paper assesses the status of pre-disaster risk management in the case of Turkey. By 
focusing on the period following the catastrophic August 17, 1999 earthquake, the study benefits 
from USAID’s Disaster Risk Management Benchmarking Tool (DRMBT). In line with the 
benchmarking tool, the paper covers key developments in the four components of pre-disaster 
risk management, namely: risk identification, risk mitigation, risk transfer and disaster 
preparedness. In the end, it will present three major conclusions: (i) Although post-1999 Turkey 
has made some important progress in the pre-disaster phase of DRM, particularly with the 
enactment of obligatory earthquake insurance and tightened standards for building construction, 
the country is far away from substantial levels of success in DRM. (ii) In recent years, local 
governments have had been given more authority in the realm of DRM, however, Turkey’s 
approach to DRM is still predominantly centralized at the expense of successful DRM practices 
at the local level. (iii) While the devastating 1999 earthquake has resulted in advances in the pre-
disaster components of DRM; progress has been mostly in the realm of earthquakes. Turkey’s 
other major disasters (landslides, floods, wild fires i.e.) also require similar attention by local and 
central authorities.  
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Introduction 
 Turkey, which is located at the juncture of three continents, namely Europe, Asia, and 
Africa, has suffered from several disasters throughout its history. The North Anatolian Fault, one 
of the most vigorous seismic zones in the world, has resulted in two of the most devastating 
earthquakes in the country’s history. In the 1939 Erzincan (Northwestern city) earthquake, more 
than thirty-two thousand people died, while the recent August 1999 earthquake in the Marmara 
region resulted in huge human and economic costs. More than seventeen thousand people lost 
their lives, around fifty thousand people were injured, and Turkey experienced economic losses 
of about five percent of its GDP. In addition to these two earthquakes, more than twenty 
thousand people died in other major earthquakes throughout the country from 1939 to 2010. 
Moreover, floods, landslides, and wild fires are other major disasters that habitually threaten the 
people of Turkey. From 1975 to 2010, more than six hundred people died due to floods. 
 The August 17, 1999 earthquake was an important test to assess Turkey’s development in 
terms of Disaster Risk Management. A few years before the devastating event, experts from the 
U.S. Geological Survey and Turkish scholars declared the potential of a high magnitude 
earthquake in the Marmara region. Having missed these evaluations, the Turkish state and the 
people largely failed to act before the disaster or respond effectively during it, leading to a higher 
human and economic toll than perhaps would have occurred if the state had acted upon this 
knowledge. If Turkey had a better DRM framework, many experts argue, the devastation could 
have been much lower. The August 17 earthquake was particularly notable in demonstrating the 
serious deficiencies in the country’s risk mitigation, risk transfer and disaster preparedness 
efforts. 
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 This study attempts to assess the status of pre-disaster risk management in Turkey 
following the August 17, 1999 earthquake. To do so, it utilizes USAID’s “Disaster Risk 
Management Benchmarking Tool”. While this paper does not use the 276 questions employed in 
the benchmarking tool for the assessment of Turkey’s DRM, it does incorporate an evaluation of 
four key areas (policy-legislation, local government, education-public awareness, and 
international support) of its pre-disaster risk management. 
 In what follows, a brief discussion of the August 17, 1999 earthquake will take place. In 
particular, the section will present the major lessons of the earthquake and their impact on 
Turkey’s level of progress in the realm of DRM. Then, the paper will highlight USAID’s 
Benchmarking Tool (DRMBT), its purpose, and the way it is used. In the following part, the 
status of pre-disaster risk management in Turkey will be examined utilizing aspects of the 
Benchmarking Tool. In doing so, the section will provide an overview of the key DRM related 
developments in the aftermath of the 1999 earthquake. Finally, the concluding section will not 
only be an overview of the paper but also proffer policy suggestions for the Turkish authorities. 
 
The August 17, 1999 Earthquake 
 The August 17, 1999 Izmit/Marmara earthquake is one of the most disastrous seismic 
events in Turkey’s recent history. Since the 1939 Erzincan earthquake, which resulted in more 
than thirty-two thousand deaths, the country has witnessed seven earthquakes with a Richter 
scale of 7 and above. (Table 1) The recent August 1999 earthquake comes only second to the 
1939 earthquake in terms of the human toll, causing more than seventeen thousand deaths, and 
about fifty thousand more injuries. The earthquake also affected 120,000 housing units, resulting 
in heavy damages and collapses, In addition, leaving four to six hundred thousand people 
  
3
homeless. On the economic side, Turkey faced a loss of about 8-30 billion dollars.1 The 
earthquake hit the key industrial region of the country, substantially enhancing the level of 
economic losses.2 
Table 1: Major Earthquakes in Turkey (1939-2010) 
Earthquake (Date, City, Region) Magnitude Fatalities 
1939 12 26, Erzincan, East 7.8 32,700 
1942 12 20, Tokat, Central 7.6 4,000 
1943 11 26, Samsun, North  7.6 4,000 
1944 02 01, Bolu, Northwest 7.4 2,790 
1953 03 18, Balikesir, West 7.3 1,073 
1966 08 19, Mus, East 6.8 1,529 
1970 03 28, Izmir, West 6.9 1,086 
1975 09 06, Diyarbakir, Southeast 6.7 2000 
1983 10 30, Erzurum, East 6.9 1,342 
1999 08 17, Izmit,  Northwest 7.4 17,118 
1999 11 12, Duzce, Northwest 7.2 894 
2003 05 01, Bingol, East 6.4 177 
2010 03 08, Bingol, East 6.1 51 
 
Source: U.S Geological Survey, “Historic World Earthquakes”, Turkey 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/historical_country.php#turkey 
 
 
 Turkey’s weak record of Disaster Risk Management was a major reason for the high 
human and economic losses related to the 1999 earthquake. In other words, Turkey could have 
avoided substantial losses if it had performed better in the various dimensions of pre-disaster risk 
management. In this regard, one should discuss Turkey’s particular failures in risk mitigation and 
disaster preparedness. For example, the U.S. Geological Survey and Turkish scholars made a 12-
20% prediction that the Marmara region could have an earthquake with a 6.5 or above magnitude 
on the Richter scale by 2025, two years before the event.3 Nonetheless, the earthquake caught the 
                                                          
1
 “Event Report: Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake”, RMS Reconnaissance Team, Risk Management Solutions, Inc. 
(http://www.rms.com/Publications/Turkey_Event.pdf), Murat Saatcioglu et al 2001, “The August 17, 1999, Kocaeli 
(Turkey) earthquake — Damage to Structures”, Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, 28: 715-737 
2
 The Izmit-Istanbul (Marmara) region, in which the earthquake hit most, generates forty percent of Turkey’s annual 
industrial production with about 7 percent of GDP. (“Event Report: Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake”) 
3
 “Event Report: Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake” 
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region unprepared. First of all, as the most industrialized and urbanized part of the country, the 
region had high rates of poorly designed and constructed buildings. A majority of residential 
buildings in the region were multi-story (4 to 8) apartments, many which failed to meet building 
codes. Though Turkey had a modern building code, to a great extent, it failed in its 
implementation and enforcement.4 Particularly notable was the fact that the government allowed 
many buildings in the earthquake region to be built upon active faults. In the end, this level of 
incompetence weak enforcement made the August 17 earthquake a much more devastating 
natural disaster for the country than it might have been given stronger state action in this regard. 
 A major lesson from the 1999 earthquake is that Turkey cannot afford to continue living 
with weak DRM mechanisms. Many Turkish and international scientists believe that there is a 60 
percent chance of another major earthquake along the North Anatolian Fault, which the 
metropolitan city of Istanbul essentially sits on, by 2030.5 Such a massive earthquake is expected 
to result in hundreds of thousands of people dead and over a hundred billion dollars in economic 
losses.6 Therefore, as a country located near the powerful North Anatolian Fault, the Turkish 
government and society should take DRM more seriously. (Figure 1) In Turkey, 43 percent of 
city centers are within the highest earthquake risk zone, while 27 percent are located in the 
second most risky zone. The third zone incorporates 16 percent of the country’s city centers, the 
fourth zone includes 11 percent of Turkey’s city centers, and while the lowest risk earthquake 
                                                          
4
 Turkey’s 1975-year building code was adapted from the Uniform Building Code in California.  “Izmit, Turkey 
Earthquake of August 17, 1999”, EQE Briefing (Available online at: 
http://www.absconsulting.com/resources/Catastrophe_Reports/izmit-Turkey-1999.pdf) 
5
 “Istanbul quake likely by 2030”, BBC news, April 27, 2000 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/727966.stm) 
6
 “Event Report: Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake” 
zone has only 3 percent of its city centers.
should be a national priority for the earthquake prone Turkey.
Figure 1: Seismic Hazard Map of Turkey 
Source: The Ministry of Public Works 
Emergency Management Presidency, Office of the Prime Minister (Ankara, Turkey
http://www.deprem.gov.tr/sarbis/Shared/DepremHaritalari.aspx
Note: The earthquake hazard map shows five levels of risk across the country. While the red areas involve the 
highest risk (Level 1) the white colored part of country is prone to the lowest risk (Level 5)
the risk level II, the yellow areas have the risk level III, and the light yellow regions involve the risk level IV.
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 Bulent Ozmen 2000, 17 Agustos 1999 Izmit Korfezi Depreminin Hasar Durumu
August 17, 1999 Earthquake, Turkish Earthquake Foundation, Ankara, Turkey
(It is available online at: http://www.deprem.gazi.edu.tr/upload/20071103143847.pdf
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 Therefore, improving the level of DRM performance 
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USAID’s Disaster Risk Management Benchmarking Tool   
 The Benchmarking Tool was prepared for the Caribbean Open Trade Support Program 
(COTS), funded by the United States Agency for International Development.8 The central 
objective behind this study was ‘to improve the ability of national governments, civil society 
organizations, and the private sector to proactively plan and implement effective and efficient 
actions that would reduce their vulnerability to natural disasters and create greater economic 
resilience when they do occur’.9 Although the tool was prepared for Caribbean countries in 
particular, it was designed to be applicable to other countries more broadly. Having aimed at 
creating a comprehensive, non-technical, and simple-to-implement tool, the Benchmarking Tool 
is a comprehensive disaster management framework built on the basis of an extensive literature 
review. Thereafter, it addresses six components of DRM activities: risk identification, risk 
mitigation, risk transfer, disaster preparedness, emergency response, and recovery. While the 
first four components are part of the pre-disaster phase, the last two components deal with the 
post-disaster phase of risk management. In addition, each component is composed of four areas. 
The four components of the pre-disaster phase are seen in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Disaster Risk Management Benchmarking Tool, Prepared for USAID Caribbean Open Trade Support Program, 
2006 
9
 The Benchmarking Tool, p.9 
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Table 2: Pre-Disaster Components of Risk Management10 
 
Risk Identification Risk Mitigation Risk Transfer Disaster 
Preparedness 
Hazard assessment Physical and 
engineering 
mitigation works 
 
Insurance and 
reinsurance of public 
infrastructure and 
private assets 
Early warning and 
communication 
systems 
 
 
Vulnerability 
Assessment 
Land-use planning 
and building codes 
Financial market 
instruments 
Contingency 
planning 
 
Risk assessment Economic incentives 
for pro-mitigation 
behavior 
Privatization of public 
services with safety 
regulation 
Networks of 
emergency 
responders 
 
Hazard monitoring 
and forecasting 
Education, training 
and awareness about 
risks and prevention 
Calamity Funds 
(national or local 
level) 
Shelter facilities and 
evacuation plans 
 
 
  
To assess the DRM status of a country, the Benchmarking Tool creates indexes for each 
of the six components of DRM. Then, it generates an overall Disaster Risk Management Index 
(DRMI). To do so, the Tool employs three hundred sixty six (366) assessment questions.11 For 
each assessment question, three responses are provided: yes, no, and planned. The answers are 
then coded as 3, 0, and 1 respectively. After that, a separate index for the six components of 
DRM is created along with the DRMI-overall index. 
 Although each component of DRM involves specific assessment questions, one can 
notice important commonalities across these questions. In this regard, five key issues should be 
noted: presence/absence of DRM element (hazard maps i.e.), presence/absence of relevant 
                                                          
10
 The table is derived from “Table 1: Key Components of Risk Management”, Inter-American Development Bank 
(2000) – Facing the Challenge of Natural Disasters in Latin America and the Carribean: an IDB Action Plan-, cited 
in “Disaster Risk Management Benchmarking Tool”, USAID, p. 10 
11
 The number of questions for each component of DRM is as follow:  risk identification (99), risk mitigation (52), 
risk transfer (38), disaster preparedness (87), emergency response (51), rehabilitation and reconstruction (39). DRM 
Benchmarking Tool, p.12. For the list of assessment questions, see pages 14-30. 
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policy/legislation, local level involvement/local capacity, education-public awareness, and the 
level of international support. However, some components of DRM include assessment questions 
that are related to only a few of these five issues. For example, risk transfer assessment questions 
do not include anything about international support. Despite these variations across different 
DRM components, the five issues could be very helpful in providing a short-cut analysis of 
DRM status of a country. In the next section, the paper will assess the status of Turkey’s pre-
disaster phase of DRM through a particular focus on these five issues. 
 
Pre-Disaster Risk Management in the post-1999 Turkey 
 Following the conceptualization of Disaster Risk Management in the Benchmarking 
Tool, this section will examine Turkey’s pre-disaster risk management status by focusing on four 
components: risk identification, risk management, risk transfer and disaster preparedness. Each 
component also comes with four elements. 
 
Risk Identification 
 The risk identification component of DRM involves four elements, namely hazard 
assessment, vulnerability assessment, risk assessment, and hazard monitoring and forecasting. 
Hazard assessment primarily deals with the preparation of hazard maps for all relevant hazard 
types. The maps need to be reliable and updated regularly. In addition, it is critically important 
that people are aware of these maps. At the policy level, whether or not certain legislation exists 
for the creation of up-to-date hazard maps is also significant. Vulnerability and risk assessment 
elements are built upon these hazard assessments, but they go further by elaborating on the 
potential physical, social, and economic implications of identified hazards. Finally, hazard 
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monitoring and forecasting not only keep hazard assessments up-to-date, but they also augment 
preparedness measures. 
 In terms of risk identification, post-1999 Turkey has taken several important steps. The 
August 17, 1999 earthquake was a major accelerating event in this area. While the seismic 
hazard map already existed (see figure 1), two important developments after the earthquake have 
improved Turkey’s capacity in the areas of vulnerability and risk assessment. First, the 
Earthquake Master Plan for Istanbul (EMPI), prepared by Turkey’s four leading universities for 
the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul, was a milestone event for the city.12 The EMPI 
consists of a seismic assessment, urges rehabilitation of existing buildings on the basis of risk 
profiles, touches upon education and social issues, and develops a framework for disaster risk 
management. The Master Plan also calls for a three-part action plan: a (i) contingency plan, (ii) a 
local action plan, along with (iii) research and activity programs. 
 The second major development after 1999 in the area of risk assessment has been the 
creation of the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) in June 2009. The 
establishment of AFAD has been quite useful in improving coordination within the DRM field. 
The AFAD has taken over the function of three institutions that were working in the field before 
June 2009. Particularly important, the new Presidency has incorporated key components of 
Disaster Risk Reduction into its institutional structure. It has departments related to earthquake 
risk management, planning and mitigation, recovery, civil defense and response.13 Henceforth, 
its structural configuration had the potential to provide more effective and powerful mechanisms 
                                                          
12
 The full-text of the Master Plan is available at the website of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. (Published in 
2003; 569 pages:  
http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/SubSites/IstanbulVeDeprem/Calismalarimiz/Documents/IBB.IDMP.ENG.pdf) 
13
 The English version of the AFAD’s website is available at: http://www.afetacil.gov.tr/Ingilizce_Site/index.html 
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for different components of DRM. The two departments (earthquake, and planning and 
mitigation) focus on the pre-disaster phase of DRM.  
 The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency has three boards for the execution 
of better DRM practices: the (i) Disaster and Emergency Management Higher Board (minimum 
two annual meetings), the (ii) Disaster and Emergency Management Coordination Board 
(minimum four annual meetings), and the (iii) Earthquake Advisory Board (minimum four 
annual meetings). In the last meeting of the Earthquake Advisory Board (October 25, 2010), the 
Board decided to finalize workings on the preparation of a ‘National Earthquake Strategy’ by the 
end of 2010. In addition, the board meeting reviewed the following DRR related issues: studies 
for the earthquake database, earthquake hazard maps, earthquake scenarios and risk analyses, 
education and public awareness, earthquake safe settlement and buildings, as well as legal and 
financial issues.14  
 In the Benchmarking Tool, assessment questions for risk identification involve issues in 
five major areas: the absence/presence of hazard maps for all relevant disasters, the existence of 
policy-legislation, local capacity/involvement, education/public awareness, and support from 
international actors. Although post-1999 Turkey has realized some important progress as 
discussed above, it has also failed in several important areas. First of all, though the August 17, 
1999 earthquake resulted in the acceleration of risk assessment for earthquakes, Turkey 
continues to lack hazard maps for floods, landslides and wild fires. Floods are the second most 
disastrous hazard type in the country, killing 1,235 people, and destroying 61,000 houses in 1308 
floods between 1955 and 2002.15 (See tables 3 and 4 for more information on Turkey’s flood 
statistics.) Despite the fact that floods continue to be one of the country’s major disasters, Turkey 
                                                          
14
 The meeting reports (in Turkish) are available at the website of the Earthquake Advisory Board: 
http://www.deprem.gov.tr/sarbis/DDK/DDK_WEB.htm 
15
 The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement 
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has yet to develop hazard maps for floods. Currently, the Ministry of Public Works and 
Settlement is working with the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs to prepare a national hazard map for floods.16 Nevertheless, 
Turkey remains without hazard maps for the other major hazards facing the population, 
landslides and wild fires. 
Table 3: Major Floods in Turkey17 
 
Date Affected Area # of Deaths 
Sept 11,1957 Ankara 180 
June 19, 1990 Trabzon 45 
July 13, 1995 Isparta 75 
Nov 4, 1995 Izmir 65 
May 21, 1998 Zonguldak-Filyos 27 
August 7, 1998 Trabzon-Beskoy 60 
May 21-25, 1998 Western Black Sea Region 10 
July 23, 2002 Rize 40 
Oct 31, 2006 Diyarbakir 22 
Sept 7, 2009 Istanbul 31 
August 27, 2010 Rize 12 
 
 
Table 4: 1975-2009 Floods18 
Period # of Floods # of Deaths Economic Damage $ US 
1975-79 160 85 57 Million 
1980-89 152 63 1.5 billion 
1990-99 102 310 2 billion 
2000-09 281 176 160 million 
                                                          
16
 “Turkiye’nin Sel Risk Haritasi Cikarilacak- Turkey’s flood risk map to be launched”, August 1, 2009 - 
http://www.netgazete.com/News/618653/turkiyenin_sel_riski_haritasi_cikarilacak.aspx 
17
 The information is derived from the following sources: Mustafa Altundal, “The Economic Dimension of Floods”, 
The Ministry of Environment and Forestry, March 2010 
(http://www.dsi.gov.tr/duyuru/2.UlusalTaskinSemp/PANEL%20SUNULARI/Panel%205.%20Taskinlarin%20Sosy
olojik,%20Psikolojik,%20Ekonomik%20Boyutu%20[PDF]/5.4.TASKINLARIN%20EKONOMIK%20BOYUTU%
20[M.ALTUNDAL].pdf and Ceylan et al 2007, “Causes and Effects of  Flood Hazards In Turkey” 
http://www.dsi.gov.tr/english/congress2007/chapter_4/105.pdf and EM-DAT, The International Disaster Database 
(http://www.emdat.be/database).  
18
 Source: Mustafa Altundal, “The Economic Dimension of Floods”, The Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 
March 2010 
(http://www.dsi.gov.tr/duyuru/2.UlusalTaskinSemp/PANEL%20SUNULARI/Panel%205.%20Taskinlarin%20Sosy
olojik,%20Psikolojik,%20Ekonomik%20Boyutu%20[PDF]/5.4.TASKINLARIN%20EKONOMIK%20BOYUTU%
20[M.ALTUNDAL].pdf )  
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 At the policy level, Turkey’s 1959 Disasters Law (Law No: 7269) focuses on the post-
disaster phase of DRM, particularly emergency aid, neglecting efforts that would contribute to 
risk reduction such as risk assessments. As discussed earlier, the creation of AFAD in 2009 has 
been an important step at the institutional level, but so far it has not generated hazard maps for 
non-earthquake hazards. That said, the current draft for the Law of Disaster, Emergency Aid, and 
Civil Defense incorporates pre-disaster dynamics of DRM with the inclusion of risk assessment, 
risk mitigation, and disaster preparedness provisions.19 The draft also has articles concerning the 
preparation of hazard maps for all relevant hazard types. 
 The risk assessment component of DRM has also substantial deficiencies at the local 
level. Neither the AKOM (The Center for Studies on Disaster Preparedness of the Istanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality20) nor the AFAD’s directorates in the cities have any capacity for risk 
assessment. In regard to the public awareness of hazard maps, Turkey fails to a great extent. 
Given the fact that the country does not have hazard maps (except earthquakes) for all relevant 
disasters, the lack of knowledge at the public level should not be surprising. 
 Finally, the role of international actors in Turkey’s record on improving its risk 
assessment capacity has been very limited. Except for the cooperation between the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in the area 
of earthquakes, Turkey has not received any support from the international DRR community in 
the preparation of hazard maps. 
 Overall, the risk assessment component of DRR in post-1999 Turkey needs further 
improvement at various levels: the preparation of hazard maps for all relevant disasters, the 
                                                          
19
 The full-text of the legislative draft (in Turkish) is available online at: 
http://www.afetacil.gov.tr/mevzuat/kanun/AFAD%20Kanun%20Tasarisi.pdf  (31 pages) 
20
 http://www.ibb.gov.tr/sites/akom/Documents/iletisim.html. For English: 
http://www.ibb.gov.tr/sites/akom/Documents/AKOM_STUDIES_ON_DISASTER_PREPAREDNESS.pdf 
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enactment and effective implementation of the new Disasters Law, which incorporates the pre-
disaster phase of DRR, the enhancement of local capacity in the preparation of hazard maps and 
hazard monitoring, increasing public knowledge and consciousness about hazard maps, and 
greater support from the international DRR community. 
 
 
Risk Mitigation 
 The Benchmarking Tool divides the risk mitigation component of DRM into four areas: 
(i) physical and engineering works (ii) land-use planning & building codes (iii) economic 
incentives for pro-mitigation behavior, and (iv) education, training, and awareness about risks 
and prevention. Turkey’s performance in risk mitigation during the post-1999 period resembles 
its progress in the realm of risk identification. Despite some important and positive institutional 
and legislative developments, the country needs to take further steps forward, particularly in the 
enforcement of building codes and supervision of construction, building retrofitting, the 
implementation of urban regeneration projects, increasing the role of local governments in this 
process, and enhancement of top level political commitment to risk mitigation for all hazard 
types. 
 As pointed out in the earlier part of this paper, Turkey did have a building code, adapted 
from the Uniform Building Code in California, well before the devastating 1999 earthquake. 
However, poor implementation of the 1975 building code resulted in the serious human and 
economic toll of the 1999 quake. After the earthquake, the Turkish parliament adopted the Law 
of Construction Supervision (Law No: 4708, July 2001) to ensure the successful implementation 
of building code. For this purpose, the Law sanctioned private Building Inspection Firms to 
assess all construction projects and report to local authorities, which regulate the construction 
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and occupation of buildings.21 In the beginning, the Law applied to only 19 of Turkey’s 81 cities. 
But, the fact that 70 percent of the country’s cities have first and second level risks for 
earthquakes, it has become essential to apply the Law more broadly.22 Although the action was 
taken quite late, Decree 624 (July 2010) has made the Law of Construction Supervision 
enforceable in all cities.23  
 The massive human and economic toll of the August 17 earthquake has demonstrated that 
building retrofitting and urban regeneration projects should have priority in the city of Istanbul. 
The Earthquake Master Plan for Istanbul (2003) and the draft for the new Disasters Law (2010) 
have noted the significance of urban regeneration projects; however, only a few projects have 
been realized so far.24 With regard to building retrofitting, the Turkish government has 
undertaken a joint project with the World Bank to mitigate seismic risks in Istanbul (‘Istanbul 
Seismic Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness Project’). The project is composed of four 
components: (i) enhancing emergency preparedness, (ii) seismic risk mitigation for public 
facilities, (iii) enforcement of building codes, and (iv) project management.25 In addition, the 
                                                          
21
 Gulcan Uluturk 2006, Local Administrations and Disaster Risk Management in Turkey, Unpublished M.S Thesis, 
Middle East Technical University, Ankara, p.105-6 
22
 Ibid, Ozmen 2000, 17 Agustos 1999 Izmit Korfezi Depreminin Hasar Durumu- The Damage Condition of the 
August 17, 1999 Earthquake 
23
 For the text of the law 4708 and the decree 624 (in Turkish), see the following pages: 
http://www.yapidenetim.org.tr/mevzuat/kanun/4708_sayili_yapi_denetim_kanunu.php and 
http://www.alomaliye.com/2010/4708_sayili_yapi_denetimi.htm The decree will be entered force on January 1, 
2011. 
24
 For example, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality launched an urban regeneration project in the district of 
Zeytinburnu in 2008. The Municipality, which has  plans for other projects, has also established a directorate for 
urban regeneration. 
(http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/Pages/Haber.aspx?NewsID=15984 and  
 http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/Kurumsal/Birimler/KentselDonusumMd/Pages/AnaSayfa.aspx) 
25
 Ibid, Local Administrations and Disaster Risk Management in Turkey, p.120-1 
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European Investment Bank decided to allocate 200 million Euros in October 2010 to help Turkey 
retrofit public buildings and schools.26 
 The establishment of a new Disasters Presidency (AFAD), along with the Earthquake 
Advisor Board, is definitely an important development in post-1999 Turkey. Particularly 
important, the AFAD and the draft for the new Disasters Law have incorporated pre-disaster 
components of DRM, including risk mitigation, into their operations. Considering that Turkey’s 
old Disasters Law (1959) neglected important aspects of the pre-disaster phase of DRM, the 
AFAD and the draft law should be considered important steps for risk mitigation.27 The AFAD 
has a directorate for risk mitigation issues, while the draft law includes a section for risk 
mitigation with a focus on hazard maps, urban regeneration, land-use planning, and supervision 
of construction.28 Turkey, as a disaster prone country, should have incorporated such pre-disaster 
components of DRM earlier in order to avoid the serious damages it has suffered from past 
natural hazards such as the 1999 earthquake. 
 In addition to physical/engineering works and land-use planning/building codes, the 
Benchmarking Tool takes note of economic incentives for pro-mitigation behavior, along with 
education/training/awareness about risks and prevention. With regard to economic incentives for 
pro-mitigation behavior, post-1999 Turkey has not had any development. However, it has made 
some progress in the latter element of risk mitigation (education/training i.e.). The newly created 
AFAD and the ongoing draft of the New Disasters Law include elements to increase public 
awareness for risk mitigation. In addition, Turkey has received support from the international 
                                                          
26
 “Turkiye’ye 200 Milyon Deprem Fonu- 200 million Euros Funding of Earthquake for Turkey, October 23, 2010, 
CNNTurk, 
http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/ekonomi/genel/10/23/turkiyeye.200.milyon.euro.deprem.fonu/594075.0/index.html 
27
 ‘The Disasters Law’ (1959); Law No: 7269. The text in Turkish is available online in the website of the Ministry 
of Public Works and Settlement: http://www.bayindirlik.gov.tr/turkce/html/kanun12.htm 
28
 The Draft Law; section 2, articles 4-9: 
http://www.afetacil.gov.tr/mevzuat/kanun/AFAD%20Kanun%20Tasarisi.pdf 
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community. For example, the United Nations Development Program has undertaken a project for 
disaster prevention in cooperation with the Turkish government and universities29 aimed at 
raising local capacity and public awareness of risk mitigation strategies. Moreover, the American 
Red Cross, the Turkish Red Crescent Society, and Bogazici University have executed a project 
for non-structural mitigation.30 This project has attempted to develop a cadre of community 
instructors across Turkey who will eventually introduce non-structural mitigation programs into 
schools across the country. Incorporating education about risks and prevention into the school 
system are of central importance for risk mitigation. Thus, Turkish authorities are now planning 
to put training for hazards into school curricula. The ongoing study on the ‘National Earthquake 
Strategy’, which is being prepared by the Earthquake Advisory Board, will also deal with this 
issue.31 
 Overall, Turkey has made some progress in implementing the risk mitigation component 
of DRM in the period following the 1999 earthquake. A new law has been created for the 
supervision of construction. The current draft of the new Disasters Law has a vision 
incorporating pre-disaster components of DRM, including risk mitigation. The Istanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality has launched urban regeneration projects. And, the newly created 
Disasters Presidency (AFAD) has a directorate for risk mitigation. In spite of these positive 
steps, Turkey’s current DRM profile, particularly its risk mitigation component, has fundamental 
deficiencies in terms of the enforcement of building codes across the country, building 
retrofitting, urban regeneration, as well as education/training about risk mitigation.  
 
                                                          
29
 See; http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/documents/publications/corporatereport/europe/turkey1.pdf 
30
 See; http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/disasters/resources/about-disasters/cs-turkey.pdf 
31
 The Earthquake Advisory Board meeting on June 14, 2010. 
(http://www.deprem.gov.tr/sarbis/DDK/DDK_WEB.htm) 
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Risk Transfer 
 The Benchmarking Tool focuses on four areas when analyzing the risk transfer 
component of Disaster Risk Management: the (i) insurance and reinsurance of public 
infrastructure and private assets, (ii) financial market instruments, (ii) privatization of public 
services with safety regulation, and (iv) calamity funds (national or local level). Turkey’s record 
shows that it has had some success in the first and last policy areas, while the second and third 
risk transfer mechanisms are substantially deficient. 
 Until the August 17, 1999 earthquake, Turkey had a state-led insurance system for 
natural disasters. The country’s 1959 Disasters Law made the state responsible for damages 
related to natural hazards. After the earthquake, an important change happened in the 
management of natural hazard insurance. The Turkish government, through Decree No: 587 
(December 1999), established the Compulsory Earthquake Insurance system (CEI), eliminating 
the state obligation to cover disaster losses for residential buildings constructed after September 
2000 within the boundaries of municipalities.32 Public/official buildings, along with residential 
buildings in rural areas, have remained outside of the CEI, considered an important limitation.33 
To handle the CEI, the Turkish government established a Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP).34 
The TCIP had 2,428.000 policies in 2001, 3,436.000 in 2009, and 3,156.000 in 2010 (as of 
December).35 As of 2009, only 27 percent of residential buildings were under the coverage of the 
TCIP. Particularly notable is the substantial variation across the country in terms of compulsory 
earthquake insurance. (See the Table 5) Moreover, the CEI system covers only damages due to 
                                                          
32
 Full-text of the Decree 587 (in Turkish) is available online at: http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/10073.html 
33
 Ibid, Local Administrations and Disaster Risk Management in Turkey, p.103-5 
34
 The website of the Turkish Catastrophe Insruance Pool is available in English at: http://www.tcip.gov.tr/ The 
following paper by Selamet Yazici who is the Head of TCIP Executive Board is also useful: “The Turkish 
Catastrophe Insurance Pool  (TCIP) and the Compulsory Earthquake  Insurance Scheme”. 
(http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/114715/istanbul03/docs/istanbul03/11yazici3-n[1].pdf) 
35
 For information about the TCIP statistics, see: http://www.tcip.gov.tr/istatistik1.html 
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earthquakes, while leaving out damages caused by other disasters, such as floods, the second 
most disastrous natural hazard in the country,36 another significant limitation of the CEI. 
Table 5: Earthquake Insurance, Penetration Rates by Regions (2009) 
Region Total Residence Insured Residence Penetration 
Rates % 
Aegean / West 2, 045 662 540 124 26.40 
Mediterranean / South 1, 663 126 307 607 18.50 
Eastern Anatolia / East 597 554 82 064 13.73 
Southeast Anatolia 
/Southeast 
757 098 84 462 11.16 
Marmara / Northwest 4, 416 073 1, 433 919 32.47 
Central Anatolia / Central 2, 227 055 760 514 34.15 
Black Sea / Northwest 1, 282 096 227 171 17.72 
Turkey TOTAL 12, 998 664 3, 435 861 26.45 
 
Source:  Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool Compulsory Earthquake Insurance (DASK), Annual Report 
2009 (http://www.dask.gov.tr/data/dask2009en.pdf) 
 
As stated earlier, post-1999 Turkey has done nothing related to developing ‘financial 
market instruments’ to facilitate risk transfer or to ‘privatize public services with safety 
regulations’. With regard to ‘calamity funds’, the record has been much better. Under the Office 
of Prime Minister, Turkey has a national catastrophe fund. However, the country does not have a 
catastrophe fund at the local level.  
 
Disaster Preparedness 
There are four areas in the Benchmarking Tool’s assessment of the disaster preparedness 
component of DRM: (i) early warning and communication systems (ii) contingency planning (iii) 
networks of emergency responders, and (iv) shelter facilities and evacuation plans. In these 
areas, Turkey’s record is far from satisfactory, and many important steps should be taken 
immediately to improve this situation. 
                                                          
36
 Ibid, Local Administrations and Disaster Risk Management in Turkey, p.160 
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While the Earthquake Master Plan for Istanbul (2003) notes the significance of 
establishing earthquake early warning systems to avoid fires, explosions, and other damages 
during earthquakes, and urgently calls for improving the existing systems (p. 60, 515), Turkey 
has not realized a considerable level of progress in this area since the 1999 earthquake. Recently, 
the draft text for the New Disasters Law (2010) makes the Disaster and Emergency Management 
Presidency responsible for the coordination of efforts to establish early warning systems at the 
national and local levels.37 In addition, the Bogazici University Kandilli Observatory Center 
launched a project in 2010, in cooperation with the German Research Center for Geosciences, to 
establish an earthquake early warning system.38 Although these efforts are positive 
developments, Turkey does not currently have an effective early warning system for earthquakes 
or other natural hazards. 
In regards to ‘contingency planning’, developing ‘networks of emergency responders’, 
and establishing ‘shelter facilities and evacuation plans’, Turkey’s performance has not been 
much different from its progress in improving its early warning and communication systems. The 
draft text for the New Disasters Law has several articles about contingency planning for disasters 
at the district, city, and national levels.39 Currently, the Disaster and Emergency Management 
Presidency and municipal governments are responsible for preparing and applying contingency 
plans,40 however; there are substantial deficiencies in practice. 
 
 
                                                          
37
 Ibid; article 5; http://www.afetacil.gov.tr/mevzuat/kanun/AFAD%20Kanun%20Tasarisi.pdf 
38
 “Kablosuz Deprem Erken Uyari Sistemi-Wireless Earthquake Early Warning System”: 
http://www.teknolojide.com/kablosuz-deprem-erken-uyari-sistemi_2805.aspx 
39
 Ibid; article 10-15; http://www.afetacil.gov.tr/mevzuat/kanun/AFAD%20Kanun%20Tasarisi.pdf 
40
 For the duties of municipalities regarding contingency planning, see Municipalities Law, 5393 (2005); article 53  
(http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5393.html) and Provincial Special Administrations Law, 5302 (2005); article 69 
(http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/k5302.html) 
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Conclusion 
The August 17, 1999 earthquake was the second most devastating seismic activity in 
Turkey’s history in the past hundred years. While causing huge human and economic losses, the 
earthquake has also resulted in changes in Turkey’s Disaster Risk Management. This paper has 
attempted to examine the status of Turkey’s pre-disaster risk management in the post-1999 
period with the use of categorization and assessments by the USAID’s Disaster Risk 
Management Benchmarking Tool (DRMBT). Overall, the paper concludes that Turkey has made 
some important progress in pre-disaster risk management, particularly with the enactment of 
obligatory earthquake insurance and the stricter supervision of construction. However, many 
elements of DRM are substantially deficient. 
In the past ten years Turkish authorities and the disaster studies community have paid 
greater attention to Disaster Risk Management policy. The recent draft text for the New Disasters 
Law reflects the Turkish authorities’ eagerness to follow best practices in DRM. For example, 
Mehmet Ersoy, head of the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, emphasized the 
Presidency’s focus on risk management in his press release for World’s Disaster Day in October 
12, 2010, instead of the conventional focus on emergency aid.41 The ongoing effort to change the 
1959 Disasters Law, which totally neglects the pre-disaster phase of DRM, with a new one, is 
definitely an important and positive development. 
Despite the existence of some positive changes in Turkey’s conception and practice of 
pre-disaster components of DRM after the August 17 earthquake, the country is far away from 
establishing satisfactory DRM practices. As a result, the possibility of extraordinary human and 
economic losses due to earthquakes, floods, landslides and wildfires continues to exist. 
                                                          
41
 His statement is available (in Turkish) online at the website of the Disaster Presidency (AFAD) - 
http://www.afetacil.gov.tr/haber/haber_detay.asp?haberID=107 
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Particularly notable has been the high amount of attention given to earthquakes by Turkish 
authorities, while other hazards have been largely ignored. The lack of hazard maps for floods, 
landslides and wildfires is an obvious reflection of this neglect. Furthermore, institutional and 
legislative frameworks for DRM remain highly centralized in Turkey, providing local 
governments with neither the authority nor capacity to affectively manage and reduce risks. This 
centralization is one of the most significant problems facing comprehensive DRM throughout the 
country. Finally, Turkey also suffers from substantial deficiencies in education and training 
about natural hazard risks. The school curriculum does not cover risk mitigation and disaster 
preparedness. Developing a nation-wide culture focused on disaster risk reduction and 
preparedness should be an essential part of DRM activities. In this regard, the Turkish authorities 
and academic community have to allocate more resources for studies on DRM. Improving 
contact and cooperation with the international DRR community could be very helpful in 
enhancing Turkey’s performance in the DRM field. 
To conclude, post-1999 Turkey has taken some positive steps in the realm of Disaster 
Risk Management; nevertheless, it continues to have deficiencies in several areas. To address 
these deficiencies, political commitment is critical. While recent efforts to produce a new 
Disasters Law incorporating pre-disaster risk management components should be highlighted, 
only its successful enactment and implementation could tell us about the prospects for 
comprehensive DRM in Turkey’s near future. 
